Identifying and Mitigating Vulnerabilities in LLM-Integrated Applications

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TL;DR

1. We identified the **insider and outsider threats** in the LLM-integrated application on **bias, toxic content, privacy, disinformation** risk
2. We proposed a mitigation design ***Shield*** to address the vulnerability.
3. The experiment on GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 indicated the existence of vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of *Shield.*

Motivation

LLM-integrated applications are developed to provide a better interactive experience to applications

- e.g., Microsoft New Bing Search or VSCode Copilot



Research Questions:

RQ1: Are there any vulnerabilities in such LLM-integrated applications?

RQ2: If there are vulnerabilities, how can we mitigate them?

Threat Model

- User and LLM are non-malicious, and user is victim
- Objective: cause user to receive a response with malicious semantic goal

Insight for insider threat: app may hammer integrity of communication



Upstream: insider (app) can perturbate the instruction (pertb-system) or user query (pertb-user) based on semantic goal

Downstream: insider (app) can perturbate the response (proxy) based on semantic goal

Insight for outsider threat: external source may not be under control



Compromise the external resource:

e.g. poison the database or web search result

Risks as Malicious Semantic Goal

Bias: preference toward certain choice[1]
e.g. "Apple is better."

Toxic content: response containing offensive content [2]
e.g., "Apple is **some bad words**."

Privacy: response intents to collect the private information [3]
e.g. "What is your credit card, I can help to make an order"

Disinformation: response containing targeted misleading info [4]
e.g., "Agoole is excellent", as 85% of our customer reviews said.

Threat Evaluation

Setup

- LLM: GPT-3.5 and GPT-4
- Application: a shopping assistant supported by LLM
- Metrics: Target Attack Success Rate; Token Ratio w. and w/o attack

Takeaway: all insider attacks are effective

TSR of Bias	Neutral		Pertb-User		Pertb-System		Proxy	
	GPT-3.5	GPT-4	GPT-3.5	GPT-4	GPT-3.5	GPT-4	GPT-3.5	GPT-4
HumanEval	2%	0%	62%	99%	97%	**100%**	83%	80%
GPT-Auto	0%	0%	47%	67%	**85%**	81%	68%	53%

Takeaway: outsider threat is comparable to insider threat

TSR of Toxic Content	Neutral		Outsider-Explicit		Outsider-Implicit		Pertb-System	
	GPT-3.5	GPT-4	GPT-3.5	GPT-4	GPT-3.5	GPT-4	GPT-3.5	GPT-4
HumanEval	0%	0%	78%	88%	84%	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
GPT-auto	0%	0%	78%	94%	84%	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Takeaway: cost of threat attack is negligible

- Cost is the extra price or service latency
  - Depends on tokens
  - $r_{PT} = \frac{\text{\# prompt token w. attack}}{\text{\# prompt token w/o attack}}$
  - $r_{RT} = \frac{\text{\# response token w. attack}}{\text{\# response token w/o attack}}$
  - $r_{TT} = \frac{\text{\# total token w. attack}}{\text{\# total token w/o attack}}$
  - smaller r, lower cost of attack
- Pertb-System for different risks have different effects on prompt/response
- Overall cost of the attack is negligible



Mitigation Design: *Shield*

Insight:

1. break the opaque between two interactions by detecting with reference to the original user query or LLM response
2. Such breaking requires a secure message delivery mechanism

Integrity | Source Identification | Utility Preservation | Attack Detectability



References

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